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Abstract: This paper evaluates the effect of the Federal Reserve’s large scale asset purchases 
(LSAP) on international long bond yields and exchange rates and then considers whether the 
observed behavior is consistent with a simple portfolio balance model and previous estimates of 
the impact of equivalent federal funds stimulus on exchange rates.  The LSAP announcements 
substantially reduced international long-term bond yields and the spot value of the dollar.  These 
changes closely followed announcement times and were very unlikely to have occurred by 
chance.  The jump depreciations of the USD are consistent with estimates of the impacts of 
previous equivalent monetary policy shocks.  The portfolio choice model explains the changes in 
expected U.S. and foreign real bond yields very well, conditional on the observed exchange rate 
jumps. The LSAP announcements do not appear to have reduced yields by reducing expectations 
of real growth. The LSAP’s ability to reduce international long-term interest rates and the value 
of the dollar shows that central banks are not toothless when short rates hit the zero bound.   
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 Following the extreme credit market disturbances in the fall of 2008, the Federal Reserve 
announced an unusual program to purchase large quantities of long-term securities to improve 
credit market conditions, particularly in the housing market.  On November 25, 2008, the Federal 
Reserve announced that it would purchase up to $100 billion of government-sponsored enterprise 
(GSE) debt and up to $500 billion in mortgage-backed securities (MBS) to reduce risk spreads 
on GSE debt and mitigate turmoil in the market for housing credit.  On March 18, 2009, the 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) press release announced that the Federal Reserve 
would purchase an additional $750 billion of agency MBS, an additional $100 billion in agency 
debt, and $300 billion of longer-term Treasury securities.  
Kohn (2009) calls these purchases of GSE debt, MBS, and long-term Treasuries “large-scale 
asset purchases” (LSAP).  Central banks have tried similar—but much smaller—asset purchases 
before.  For example, the Federal Reserve famously attempted to influence the long end of the 
yield curve in “Operation Twist” in the early 1960s.  Modigliani and Sutch (1966) found that this 
earlier attempt to bring down long rates was, at most, moderately successful, probably because 
the purchases were insufficiently large and offset by new Treasury issuance (Blinder (2000)).  
The recent LSAP are especially informative because the program is an unusually large 
“natural experiment”—an isolated change in the economic environment—that illuminates market 
reactions and joint asset price determination.  As such, several groups of researchers have studied 
the U.S. and foreign asset purchase programs.  These papers differ in their methods, the asset 
classes studied and their conclusions about the channel through which the purchases likely 
affected asset prices.  
Aït-Sahalia et al. (2010) take the broadest view of financial crisis policy interventions by 
looking at pooled and unpooled effects of different types of interventions —i.e., interest rate 2 
 
cuts, liquidity support, liability guarantees, and recapitalization —across countries.  This bold 
approach presents a broad view of average effects but does not substitute for a close examination 
of the specific effects of heterogeneous announcements.   
Several papers specifically focus on asset purchase programs.  Stroebel and Taylor (2009) 
use time series methods to argue the Federal Reserve’s purchases of MBS produced small or 
statistically insignificant effects on mortgage-Treasury spreads—not yields— that are adjusted 
for pre-payment and default risks.  Although the Treasury-OAS [option adjusted spread] 
declined 30 basis points, the authors credit this decline to an increased commitment to guarantee 
GSE liabilities. In contrast to Stroebel and Taylor’s (2009) methods and conclusions, Gagnon et 
al.’s (2011a, 2011b) announcement study finds that LSAP announcements reduced U.S. long-
term yields (see also Kohn (2009) and Meyer and Bomfim (2010)). Joyce et al (2010) find that 
the Bank of England’s quantitative easing program had quantitatively similar bond yield effects 
as those Gagnon et al. (2011a, 2011b) find for the U.S. program. Hamilton and Wu (2010) 
indirectly calculate the effects of the LSAP with a term structure model that predicts the effects 
of changes in the maturity structure of U.S. debt from asset purchases/swaps. Their point 
estimates of the effects of a large swap of short-term for long-term debt are roughly consistent 
with the predictions of the simple PB model in this paper. 
All of the above studies consider domestic effects of financial crisis programs.   In addition 
to influencing U.S. yields, the LSAP could affect international asset prices through either the 
signaling or portfolio balance (PB) channel.
1  The signaling channel implies that the asset 
purchases could lead international investors to lower their forecasts for international growth and 
                                                 
1  Kozicki, Santor and Suchanek (2010) estimate how changes in central bank balance sheets affect international 5- 
and 10-year forward interest rates over 28-year samples. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005a) find that U.S. and 
European money markets became more sensitive to monetary policy and macro shocks after the emergence of the 
European Monetary Union (EMU). Valente (2009) examines how short-term interest rates in Hong Kong and 
Singapore respond to the unexpected component of U.S. federal funds target announcements. 3 
 
therefore lead them to expect that central banks would keep interest rates lower than previously 
expected. On the other hand, the PB channel implies that a purchase of U.S. assets would tend to 
push down the real yields on those bonds and the real yields in U.S. goods of other sovereign 
bonds of similar duration, until a new equilibrium was reached.  
The contribution of this paper is to evaluate the LSAP’s effect on international long bond 
yields and exchange rates and to consider whether the observed asset price behavior is consistent 
with a simple PB model and long-run purchasing power parity.  Because the efficient markets 
hypothesis implies that asset prices should react immediately to LSAP news, not to expected 
transactions, this paper employs event study methods to evaluate LSAP effects (Fama (1970)).
2  
The LSAP program significantly reduced the 10-year nominal yields of Australia, Canada, 
Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom and also depreciated the USD versus the currencies of 
those countries.  The jump depreciations of the USD are consistent with the previously estimated 
effects of conventional federal funds shocks of equivalent stimulus on nominal exchange rates. 
The PB model can explain the combination of expected yield and exchange rate changes at 
announcement time. Equity and oil prices show no evidence that the LSAP announcements 
reduced expected real yields by reducing expected real growth, however.  These findings 
reinforce and significantly extend the view of Gagnon et al. (2011a, 2011b) that central banks 
retain effective tools at the zero bound. 
The next section discusses the channels through which asset purchases can affect asset prices. 
Section 2 describes the LSAP events; Section 3 outlines the event study methods; the data are 
presented in Section 4.  Section 5 presents the impact of the LSAP events on nominal asset 
prices.  Section 6 discusses what to expect from a portfolio balance effect and Section 7 reviews 
                                                 
2 Concentrating on the Treasury LSAP, D’Amico and King (2010) find small (3.5 basis point) flow effects of 
purchase operations on specific issues. 4 
 
whether the actual results are consistent with such a model.  Section 8 concludes.  
1. Channels through which asset purchases affect prices 
Official asset purchases can potentially affect asset prices through three channels:  liquidity, 
signaling and PB.  Of these, the liquidity channel is likely to be the least important for the LSAP.    
The liquidity channel can raise asset prices to the extent that the Federal Reserve improves 
market liquidity by providing a consistent asset purchaser.  Gagnon et al (2011a, 2011b) argue 
that this channel is likely to have been important only very early in the LSAP program. 
The signaling channel recognizes an effect on long-term interest rates through expected 
overnight rates. If the asset purchases signal that the federal funds rate will be lower for longer 
than previously expected—perhaps due to weaker growth forecasts—then the average expected 
overnight rate (    ) will decline and reduce the long-term interest rate.  
Researchers usually motivate PB models by citing frictions—typically preferred 
habitat/market segmentation—that preclude perfect arbitrage between long and expected short 
rates.  Gagnon et al (2011a, 2011b) and Joyce et al (2010) explicitly note that they consider 
preferred habitat/market segmentation in their studies of U.S. and U.K. asset purchases.
3  These 
frictions permit changes in the maturity composition of nominal government debt to affect asset 
prices.
4 That is, if the central bank purchases a quantity of certain types of risk (i.e., duration) 
investors will demand less compensation to hold the remaining amount of that type of risk and 
the term premia component of the nominal yield will fall. Frictions are not unique to PB models, 
of course; monetary models require frictions if money is to have real effects.   
                                                 
3 Gagnon et al (2011a, 2011b) argue that the LSAP increased long-term bond prices by removing convexity from the 
public’s portfolio, reducing the required rate of return to hold long-term assets.  Convexity denotes the tendency of 
bonds with prepayment risk, such as MBS, to fall in duration as interest rates rise. Hamilton and Wu (2010) consider 
a term structure model with preferred habitat characteristics from Vayanos and Vila (2009). 
4 Official portfolio rebalancing can produce real changes in conjunction with frictions. Kumhof (2010) develops a 
model in which sterilized foreign exchange intervention is an independent monetary policy instrument that affects 
interest rates, exchange rates and consumption. 5 
 
In distinguishing the signaling and PB channels, it is useful to define the n-year yield on a 
bond as the sum of expected average instantaneous (overnight) rates and the term premium on 
that bond.   
  ,          ,         ,       ( 1 )  
where   ,    is the yield at time t on an n-year bond,     ,    is the average expected overnight rate 
over n years at time t and    ,  is the term premium on an n-year bond at time t. The term 
premium, which compensates investors for the risk of rising interest rates, is the major 
component of the U.S. Treasury risk premium, though credit and liquidity premia also contribute 
to MBS and agency debt risk premia.  
The signaling channel is often identified with changes in expected overnight rates while the 
PB channel is usually identified with changes in the term premia.  Bauer and Rudebusch (2011) 
caution against this naïve dichotomy, however: A purchase that produces a successful PB effect 
might also affect expected future overnight rates through its effect on expected growth.  
Gagnon et al (2011a, 2011b) and Bauer and Rudebusch (2011) come to different conclusions 
on the relative importance of the signaling and PB channels.  Gagnon et al (2011a) use the Kim-
Wright term structure model, swap rates and changes in short bond rates to argue that PB 
channel effects produced the great majority of the yield changes from U.S. LSAP.  Similarly, 
Joyce et al (2010) cites swap rates to argue that U.K. bond purchases were also effective through 
the PB channel. Hamilton and Wu’s (2010) term structure estimates also support a large PB 
effect. Bauer and Rudebusch (2011), however, claim a larger role for the signaling channel. In 
their preferred, restricted term structure model, the signaling channel accounts for 30 to 65 
percent of the total impact, rather than the 30 percent suggested by their interpretation of  
Gagnon et al’s (2011a) analysis.  6 
 
Formally estimating the relative effects of the PB and signaling channels in international 
bond yields is a daunting challenge and is reserved for concurrent work.  Instead, this paper will 
examine how much of the bond yield changes a PB model can explain and present indirect 
evidence on the signaling hypothesis through effects on equity and oil prices.  
2. The LSAP Events 
The LSAP program consisted of suggestions of possible future purchases, firm statements of 
planned purchases, including time-frames and quantities, and announcements of purchase 
slowdowns and a cutback.  FOMC statements and speeches described the motives for these asset 
purchases in several ways but repeatedly returned to the themes of directly supporting credit 
markets—especially for housing—to increase the availability and affordability of credit with the 
ultimate goal of stimulating real activity.  That is, the intermediate goal was to reduce medium- 
and long-term U.S. interest rates. 
Because efficient markets should react to news about future asset values, not to expected 
transactions, the effects of such purchases should occur when market expectations of such 
purchases change, typically at the purchase announcement.  Examination of press releases, 
FOMC member speeches, FOMC statements, and news reports confirms Gagnon et al.’s (2011a, 
2011b) assessment that 8 events/announcements associated with the LSAP program had 
potentially important information: 5 of those events discussed purchases or suggested future 
purchases; 3 discussed slowing and/or limiting purchases.  Table 1 describes the time and 
information content of those 8 events.  
 The FOMC announced purchases or suggested possible future purchases 5 times:  On 
November 25, 2008, the Federal Reserve announced purchases of up to $100 billion of GSE debt 
and up to $500 billion in MBS in response to widening GSE debt spreads and housing-credit 7 
 
market turmoil.  On December 1, 2008, Chairman Bernanke cited the limited ability of 
conventional monetary policy to further influence financial conditions—the Federal funds target 
was one percent—and mentioned possible purchases of “longer-term Treasury or agency 
securities on the open market in substantial quantities.”  The December 16, 2008, FOMC press 
release said that the Federal Reserve was evaluating the possibility of buying long-term Treasury 
debt.  In addition, the FOMC added the following caveat about the funds rate: “[T]he Committee 
anticipates that weak economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the 
federal funds rate for some time.” The January 28
th FOMC statement reiterated that the Fed 
stood ready to buy additional agency and Treasury debt if such actions would help credit market 
conditions.  This failure to actually announce purchases disappointed markets, but the FOMC 
soon announced such specific plans on March 18, 2009: “The Committee decided today to 
increase the size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet further by purchasing up to an additional 
$750 billion of agency mortgage-backed securities, bringing its total purchases of these securities 
to up to $1.25 trillion this year, and to increase its purchases of agency debt this year by up to 
$100 billion to a total of up to $200 billion.  Moreover, to improve credit market conditions, the 
Committee decided to purchase up to $300 billion of longer-term Treasury securities over the 
next six months.”  Finally, the caveat about the funds rate was changed to “The Committee 
…anticipates that economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the 
federal funds rate for an extended period.” 
Three announcements caused the public to expect slower or reduced purchases:  On August 
12, 2009, the FOMC statement announced that the Treasury purchases would be finished by the 
end of October, rather than September 18, as originally announced.
 5  On September 23, 2009, 
                                                 
5 The August 12, 2009 announcement contained elements that might have increased market purchase expectations. 
Specifically, the announcement made clear that the full $300 billion in Treasuries would be purchased. 8 
 
the FOMC statement said that agency debt and MBS purchases would be slowed and finished by 
the end of 2010Q1, rather than the end of 2009.  On November 4, 2009, the FOMC reduced the 
planned purchase of agency debt from $200 billion to $175 billion.   
The announced purchases were of unprecedented size.  Gagnon et al. (2011b) estimate that 
the $1.725 trillion dollar total debt purchase was 22 percent of the publically held, long-term 
agency debt, fixed-rate agency MBS, and Treasury securities outstanding as of November 24, 
2008, just prior to the first LSAP announcement.  This calculation properly takes a fairly 
comprehensive view of substitutes for U.S. Treasury debt, but it excludes U.S. corporate debt, 
which is appropriate in view of the extreme behavior of corporate-Treasury spreads during this 
period.  Unusually large Treasury issuance in 2009-2010 increased the stock of Treasuries, 
however, meaning that the 22 percent statistic might marginally overstate the size of the LSAP 
relative to the bond market.  
To briefly summarize Gagnon et al. (2011b) on the program’s institutional details: The 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York purchased securities across the yield curve, with maturities 
from 3 months to 30 years, but bought Treasuries most heavily in the 4- to 10-year range, newly 
issued MBS with 30 year maturities and generally “underpriced” issues.  The rate of purchase 
was fairly steady, but increased (decreased) when liquidity was good (poor).  
3.  Methods 
Because asset prices react relatively rapidly to “news,” an event study of the LSAP 
announcement effects is most appropriate for determining LSAP effects.
6  Event studies assume 
                                                 
6 Rigobon and Sack (2004) point out that one way to think about the econometrics of an event study is that, in a 
sufficiently short interval around the announcement, the variance of the announcement shock is arbitrarily large 
compared with the variance of the shock to the asset price, meaning that the effect of the announcement on the asset 
price is identified. Rigobon and Sack (2004) alternatively suggest identifying the responses of asset prices to interest 
rate shocks with a heteroskedasticity dependent method. The method is not applicable in the present case because 
the monetary policy shock is not easily quantifiable and there are very few data points.  9 
 
that policymakers determine the announcement prior to observing asset price movements within 
the announcement window; so, the latter changes have no effect on the announcement.
  
Event studies have often used high frequency data to precisely measure the rapid asset price 
changes usually seen after macro announcements.  The announcement literature has shown, 
however, that unexpected news or heterogeneous interpretations of news will extend adjustment 
periods for hours (e.g., Almeida, Goodhart, and Payne (1998), Love and Payne (2008) and 
Gagnon et al. (2011b)).  For example, Evans (2010) interprets evidence in Carlson and Lo (2006) 
to indicate that the market took hours to fully adjust to a surprise Bundesbank interest rate hike.  
Therefore, the LSAP announcements might have produced protracted adjustment periods.  
Therefore, this study primarily considers 1-day windows around the announcements before 
confirming the robustness of the inference to intraday and 2-day windows.
7 The 2-day changes in 
yields/prices are of the same sign but somewhat larger than the 1-day changes, consistent with 
the idea that there were protracted market adjustments to these unusual LSAP announcements. 
Typical studies of macro announcement effects pool estimates of reactions across many 
events, assuming a constant relation between the unexpected portion of the announcement and 
the asset price movement.
8  Unfortunately, it is difficult to separately quantify the effect on 
expectations of each of the 8 LSAP announcements because one cannot easily measure LSAP 
expectations.  Some announcements might have been partially expected, and so the surprise 
component was small; other events might have induced large expectations of future purchases 
although no actual purchases were announced.  One might think, however, that the combined set 
of LSAP announcements correctly informed market expectations about the eventual size of the 
                                                 
7 The U.S. Baa and expected U.S. inflation exhibited the largest discrepancies between the 1- and 2-day windows.  
The U.S. Baa yields cumulatively fell 26 more basis points during the 2-day windows than during the 1-day 
windows.  10-year expected U.S. inflation was particularly volatile, being cumulatively about 45 basis points higher 
over the 2-day windows than over the 1-day windows.   
8 Neely and Dey (2010) survey the literature on foreign exchange return reactions to macro announcements.   10 
 
program.  Therefore this paper considers separate effects for each of the 8 LSAP announcements, 
the sum of the “buy” and “sell” effects, a set of days of FOMC meetings/minutes releases on 
which there was no LSAP information, and the sum of all FOMC days.  Although I consider the 
sum of buy and sell LSAP events to best estimate the effect of LSAP announcements, this paper 
also presents results for “all FOMC events” for readers who believe that a broader set of events 
is more appropriate.  
When does an event study correctly assess the impact of some event on asset prices?  If all 
changes in event expectations occur within some set of event windows and the event drives all 
changes in expectations during this set of event windows, then the sum of the event window 
yield changes exactly measures the impact of the event.  The changes in LSAP expectations 
outside the event windows or a non-zero net effect of non-LSAP news within the event 
window—e.g., macro announcements—could bias the event window sum.  For example, if 
markets anticipated the LSAP prior to the November 25, 2008, window, then yields would have 
fallen prior to that date and the LSAP event sum would underestimate the true fall.  Conversely, 
if the final buy announcement induced false expectations of extensions of the LSAP, then these 
effects would have been priced in—temporarily reducing yields—and the LSAP buy event sum 
would overstate the true LSAP effect.  Generally, excluding events that affected LSAP 
expectations will bias the estimates but including extraneous events will produce noisy, 
inefficient estimates.  
How important are these biases?  First, the initial LSAP release seems to have been largely 
unexpected; the bond market reaction was sizeable and news reports did not anticipate it.  
Second, it is difficult to find clear evidence of falling LSAP expectations after the final buy 
announcement on March 18.  Third, analysis of news reports and high frequency data show that 11 
 
the LSAP events dominated systematic asset price movements during the LSAP event windows.  
Non-LSAP news does not appear to be an important driver of exchange rates or international 
bond yields during the LSAP windows. Appendix A details non-LSAP news during the event 
windows. 
4. The Data 
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) provides daily data on U.S. and foreign 
overnight rates.  Haver Analytics provides daily bond yields, U.S. TIPS-implied inflation 
expectations (i.e., breakeven rates), daily exchange rates, and equity index prices.  The long-term 
interest rates are the U.S. 10-year Treasury, constant-maturity yield, Moody’s Baa yield, and the 
Australian, Canadian, German, Japanese and U.K. 10-year government bond yields.
9  The daily 
exchange rate data on the AUD/USD, CAD/USD, EUR/USD, JPY/USD, and GBP/USD are 
from the H.10 release, recorded at the New York close.  Bloomberg is the source for inflation 
swaps data for the United Kingdom and the euro area.  Tickwrite provides intraday futures prices 
on Australian, Canadian, German, British, Japanese, and U.S. bonds and the S&P 500 and NY 
light crude.  Disktrading provides intraday spot exchange rate data on the AUD/USD, 
CAD/USD, EUR/USD, JPY/USD, and the GBP/USD.  
5.  The Effect of LSAP on International Asset Prices 
5.1 Daily results 
Table 2 shows the nominal (local currency) bond yield changes around 5 LSAP buy events, 3 
LSAP sell events and the sum of 13 “control” events for U.S., Australian, Canadian, German, 
Japanese, and U.K. long-term bonds.  Confirming Gagnon et al. (2011b), buy events are usually 
                                                 
9 BIS also provided zero-coupon bond data that was used for robustness checks and to evaluate the behavior of bond 
futures prices. The 10-year zero coupon yields produced very similar results to the 10-year bond yields from Haver.   12 
 
associated with large reductions in long-term U.S. interest rates in the 1-day windows.  
Specifically, the U.S. 10-year constant-maturity nominal Treasury yield fell by a cumulative total 
of 94 basis points around the 8 LSAP events while the Baa 10-year rate fell by 35 basis points.   
To provide some perspective on how likely such changes were, the numbers in parentheses 
beneath the individual and cumulative yield changes show the probability (p-values) that 
randomly chosen price changes of appropriate length from the crisis period, July 2007 through 
January 2010, would exceed those of the respective event windows.  The responses on LSAP 
announcement days are usually very large compared with the distribution of all 1-day yield 
changes and the sum of the changes over the 5 buy events is always exceedingly unlikely to be 
observed under the null hypothesis that there was nothing special about the LSAP events.  That 
is, the p-values for the “buy sums” are close to zero.  
The increase in U.S. yields on January 28, 2009, deserves some explanation.  Prior to this 
date, Federal Reserve officials had twice mentioned the possibility of purchasing Treasuries and 
the market probably priced in a sizeable positive probability of an actual Treasury purchase 
announcement on January 28.  The lack of such news probably increased long yields by reducing 
market expectations for Treasury purchases. Although one might argue that this should be 
labeled as a “sell” or “control” event, this paper categorizes it as a buy event by content; it 
discussed additional asset purchases.  
Table 2 also shows that the three sell events did not strongly or consistently affects U.S. bond 
yields, presumably because they changed expectations very little in comparison with several of 
the LSAP buy announcements.  That is, the first two sell announcements merely delayed the 
pace of purchases and the third sell announcement merely scaled back one component of the 
purchase by $25 billion, which was only 1.45 percent of the total announced LSAP purchase of 13 
 
$1.725 trillion.  
The right-hand side of Table 2 shows that the LSAP buy announcements were also—if more 
remarkably—associated with large changes in nominal foreign bond yields: Australian, 
Canadian, German, Japanese, and British long bond yields cumulatively fell by 65, 56, 38, 18, 
and 43 basis points during the same 5 buy event windows.   Japanese long yields were already 
much lower than those of other countries (see Figure 1), which probably accounts for their 
relatively modest reaction.  P-values show that the individual yield changes during buy event 
windows were often very large compared with typical 1-day changes during the July 2007 to 
January 2010 sample.  Similarly, the p-values for the “buy sum” rows show that it is very 
unlikely that the declines observed during the LSAP buy days were due to chance. As with U.S. 
bonds, foreign bond yields either rose or did not fall much in the January 28 window and they 
also did not react strongly to the 3 sell events.   
The control sums —FOMC announcement days from November 2008 through January 2010 
without significant LSAP news—are mostly positive, reflecting the generally rising bond yields 
in 2009, as the economy improved and the September 2008 flight-to-quality reversed.  A 
complementary interpretation is that every Fed announcement that did not expand the LSAP 
marginally increased yields as buy expectations were extinguished.  This hypothesis suggests 
that the appropriate set of events over which to evaluate the LSAP is “all FOMC” events. If so, 
then the last rows of Table 2 show that the LSAP reduced nominal 10-year Treasury (Baa) yields 
by 60 (41) basis points and foreign (local currency) nominal 10-year yields by an average of 22 
basis points.  This is much less than the “buy+sell” sum, but still economically significant.  
Did the LSAP announcements of long-term debt purchases also influence overnight rates?  
Table 3 documents very little movement in international overnight rates on the LSAP dates.  This 14 
 
lack of response from overnight interest rates is consistent with the argument of Gagnon et al. 
(2011a) that the LSAP did not mainly affect long rates directly through current or near-term 
expected overnight rates but rather lowered term premia by reducing the required return for 
duration and convexity.  
Table 4 shows the LSAP announcement effects on the foreign exchange value of the USD 
during the same event windows.  The USD cumulatively declined by 3.5 to almost 7.8 percent—
depending on the currency—over the 8 LSAP “buy + sell” days, and these declines were very 
large compared with sums of dollar movements over 8 randomly chosen days.
10 In contrast, the 
LSAP sell events, taken as a group, had no large or consistent effect on the value of the dollar.  
Although the dollar also tended to depreciate during the 13 control FOMC announcement 
windows, these movements were only about ¼ as large, on average, as on LSAP buy days and 
were not consistent across exchange rates.  The USD appreciated, for example, against the JPY 
during the 13 control days.   
5.2 Intraday analysis 
Intraday data confirm that the declines in bond yields and the value of the dollar closely 
followed the LSAP announcements. Figures 2 through 6 show the intraday time paths of the long 
bond futures prices (top panels), foreign exchange rates (center panels), and S&P 500 and oil 
futures prices (bottom panel) around the 5 LSAP buy announcements: 11-25-2008, 12-01-2008, 
12-16-2008, 01-28-2009, and 03-18-2009.  All series are normalized to show percentage 
deviations from the asset’s nominal value at the time of the announcement.  
Figure 2 shows that the 8:15 AM announcement of the Fed’s agency debt and MBS purchase 
                                                 
10 The largest appreciation of the dollar during these events came on December 1, 2008, when unexpectedly poor 
construction spending and ISM survey news pushed down U.S. and global equity markets, creating a flight to safety.  
That day’s appreciation was especially large against the GBP, perhaps because the U.K. Chancellor of the 
Exchequer announced that the U.K. government would back all retail deposits of London Scottish. Analysts widely 
interpreted this announcement to mean that the British government would back all retail bank deposits.  15 
 
program had a slowly developing, but eventually substantial, effect on U.S. bond futures and—to 
a lesser extent—Canadian, German, Japanese and U.K. bond futures (top panel).  The reaction in 
the foreign exchange market (center panel) was somewhat faster, with the dollar falling by 2 to 
3.5 percentage points within 2 or 3 hours, except against the JPY, where the reaction was muted 
and delayed.  The very low levels of Japanese bond yields shown in Figure 1 probably help 
explain the very modest Japanese bond futures and foreign exchange reactions in Figure 2.  The 
bottom panel of Figure 2 shows that oil prices rose on the announcement and the U.S. equity 
futures market—the S&P 500—rose immediately after it opened at 9:30 AM.  This suggests that 
the initial LSAP announcement had a positive effect on expected growth but that those changes 
were ephemeral.  
On December 1, 2008, Chairman Bernanke gave a speech that suggested that the Federal 
Reserve could buy Treasury notes and bonds if the situation warranted.  Figure 3 illustrates that 
U.S. and foreign bond futures prices climbed more immediately than they had after the 
November 25 release.  Foreign exchange markets did not react strongly or consistently to the 
speech, however.   
The December 16 FOMC release that mentioned possible purchases of Treasuries also 
produced sizeable increases in U.S., British, German, and Canadian bond futures prices, as well 
as a 1 to 3 percent depreciation of the dollar, which Figure 4 displays.  Equity markets also 
appeared to react marginally positively to the FOMC press release, which also reduced the 
federal funds target from 1 percent to a range of 0 to 25 basis points.  
In its January 28
th statement the FOMC failed to announce purchases that were probably 
partially priced-in, which produced modest bond futures price declines (i.e., higher bond yields) 
and a 0 to 2 percent appreciation of the dollar (see Figure 5).  The combination of bond price 16 
 
declines and dollar appreciation is consistent with reduced expectations of bond purchases.  
Finally, Figure 6 shows that the March 18 announcement of additional large MBS, agency 
debt, and new Treasury purchases raised bond futures prices by 1 to 3.5 percent and reduced the 
value of the dollar by 2 to 3 percent.  Equity and oil prices rose by more than 2 percent in the 
hour following the announcement, which is consistent with the interpretation that the 
announcement increased expected growth. Prices moved faster on March 18 than after previous 
announcements, suggesting that views were becoming less heterogeneous.  
In summary, foreign bond market and exchange rate markets reacted very soon after the 
LSAP announcements. The reaction pattern was fairly consistent:  Announcements that raised 
(reduced) U.S. bond futures prices tended to raise (reduce) foreign bond futures prices and 
reduce (raise) the value of the USD.  Consistent with the microstructure literature on reactions to 
complex or unexpected information, however, markets often took hours to fully price the 
announcements. 
5.3 Robustness of results to the length of the selection window 
Are the results of the event studies in Tables 2 through 4 sensitive to the length of the event 
windows?  Table 5 compares nominal asset price changes for 2.5 hour, 1-day and 2-day windows 
for sums of buy, sell, control and all FOMC events.  The intraday data are in percentage changes 
in prices while the 1-day and 2-day bond data are in changes in nominal (local currency) yields.  
To compare these data, note that a 1 percent rise in the local currency futures price of an n-year 
zero coupon bond is equivalent to a 100/n basis point reduction in nominal yield. The futures 
prices typically pertain to bonds of somewhat shorter maturities than 10-years.
11  
                                                 
11 The deliverable maturity range for the CME contract on the U.S. 10-year note is between 6.5 years and 10 years. 
The daily returns on international bond futures were highly correlated (> 85%) with implied returns from zero 
coupon yields on bonds with maturities of 7 to 10 years, depending on the country.  17 
 
Table 5 shows that buy events elicit slightly larger 2-day responses than 1-day responses.  
For example, the 2.5 hour, 1-day and 2-day average exchange rate responses are –4.8, –5.2 and  
–6.6 percent, respectively.  Other than that, the responses are fairly consistent across the lengths 
of event windows. Most notably, the high frequency responses in the control days are almost 
uniformly very small compared to the 1- or 2-day responses. This suggests that the movements 
on control days are not systematically related to the LSAP announcements and that the inclusion 
of the control days simply increases the noise in the estimates of the LSAP effects.  
6.  What To Expect From a Portfolio Balance Effect  
Gagnon et al (2011a), Joyce (2010) and Hamilton and Wu (2010) have emphasized PB 
effects as the primary channel through which official asset purchases affected asset prices. This 
section provides intuition for PB effects and develops the predictions of a simple PB model.   
6.1 A portfolio balance model of real bond returns 
To quantify the expected PB effect from a given purchase announcement, one can consider 
the portfolio choice of a mean-variance investor who represents all agents except the Federal 
Reserve/U.S. government.  The investor chooses an N-by-1 vector of portfolio weights at time t 
(  ) to maximize the following utility function:  
max     
    ,     0 . 5     
    ,      (2) 
where    ,    is the N-by-1 vector of expected real returns in U.S. goods on the assets from 
period t to t+1, V is the N-by-N covariance matrix of the asset returns and γ is the investor’s 
coefficient of relative risk aversion.  The optimal portfolio weights are given by  18 
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12           (3) 
where   ,   
   is the N by 1 vector of international nominal asset (bond) returns in local currency, 
  ,   
   is the vector of exchange rate changes (foreign currency per dollar) and   ,   
    is U.S. 
inflation.
13 Market clearing requires that the investor willingly hold the available assets. 
Therefore the optimal weights implicitly define risk-adjusted expected real returns in U.S. goods.   
    ,   
       ,   
       ,   
                 ( 4 )  
If the Federal Reserve purchases a large portion of some asset with inelastic supply (at least 
in the short-run), such as MBS, agency debt, or long-term Treasuries, then market clearing 
requires the public’s portfolio holdings of that asset to decline commensurately. To achieve this, 
some linear combination of expected returns on the N assets must fall to induce the investor to 
willingly reduce his holdings of the purchased asset.
14  An asset purchase that changes the 
public’s portfolio weights from    to   , but does not affect the covariance matrix of returns, 
would change the expected asset return vector, ΔEr, as follows:  
                             Δ E    .       ( 5 )  
In implementing the PB model, I treat agency debt and agency MBS as perfect substitutes—
i.e., the same asset—for the Treasury debt in terms of expected return and variance. This seems 
reasonable, the Treasury explicitly guaranteed agency liabilities in September 2008 and Treasury 
officials have since reiterated this promise (e.g., Barr (2010)). Additionally, financial markets 
have long believed that the U.S. government would not allow these agencies to default on their 
                                                 
12 Campbell (1999) discusses this portfolio choice model, concluding that omitting assets and extending the model 
with intertemporal hedging demand does not affect substitutability of assets. 
13  The element of    corresponding to the U.S. return is zero. 
14 Doh (2010) describes the evidence on the effect of supply shifts in several contexts.  19 
 
obligations and consequently lent to those organizations at rates that remained only very 
modestly above Treasury rates.   
The PB model implies that the LSAP programs should not only reduce expected real yields 
on U.S. bonds, but should also reduce expected real returns (in U.S. goods) on foreign bonds 
with positively correlated returns. Intuitively, if the LSAP raises U.S. bond prices, then investors 
will tend to purchase the now relatively cheaper debt of similar quality—i.e., sovereign debt of 
other developed countries—driving up the price of that debt.  The strength of the effect on the 
real returns of country j’s bonds is the product of the reduction in the weight of U.S. bonds in the 
market and the covariance between the real (U.S. denominated) bond returns of country j and 
those of the United States.
15  
Comovement of both nominal yields in national currencies and real returns in U.S. goods 
suggests that international real returns might be correlated. Figure 1 illustrates comovement in 
locally denominated U.S., Australian, Canadian, German, Japanese, and U.K. 10-year nominal 
bond yields from January 1, 2005, through April 26, 2010. Likewise, using data from January 
1985 through April 2010, correlations in monthly 7- to 10-year real bond returns in U.S. goods 
for the U.S., Canada, Germany, and U.K. vary from 0.35 for the U.S.-U.K. bond return to 0.69 
for the German-U.K. bond return.
16   
The LSAP program also increased bank reserves commensurately with the decrease in public 
bond holdings.  The increase in bank reserves reflects a strong desire for safe, liquid assets that 
the simple PB model is ill-equipped to model with its focus on the means and covariances of 
                                                 
15 Note that the change-in-weights vector, (w1-w0 ) in (5), consists of zeros, except for the element reflecting U.S. 
weights, which is equal to -0.22 times the original weight on U.S. bonds.  Although the change-in-return calculation 
in (5) would appear to depend on γ, it does not.  The original portfolio weights are calculated from equation (3):   
w   
 
 V   E   and the new portfolio weight vector, w1, equals w0, except for a 22 percent reduction on the U.S. 
bond share in w0.  Therefore the risk-aversion parameter does not affect the change-in-return calculation in equation 
(5) because it appears explicitly in the numerator but also scales the denominators of w0 and w1 and thus cancels.  
16 Warnock and Warnock (2009) find international capital flows substantially affect long-term U.S. interest rates.  20 
 
asset returns.  Therefore the PB model does not directly model the market for bank reserves.   
6.2 Comparing the model’s predictions with the data 
This subsection describes the model’s predictions about the effect of a change in U.S. 
portfolio weights on U.S. and foreign bond yields and exchange rates at the time of the LSAP 
announcements.  Equation (5) shows that a change in portfolio weights (  ) must change a linear 
combination of expected bond, exchange rate returns and/or expected U.S. inflation. The LSAP 
announcements reduced the expected portfolio weight on (only) U.S. bonds by about 22 percent. 
∆      
0.78     , 
  , 
…
  , 
   
  , 
  , 
…
  , 
   




   ,      ( 6 )  
where the ∆  operator denotes the change in the variable at the time of the announcement.  
Applying the announcement change operator, ∆ , to (4), the change in expected returns in U.S. 
goods at the time of the LSAP announcements is given by the following:  
∆     ,   
   ∆      ,   
   ∆     ,   
        ∆               (7) 
The equations relating U.S. and foreign bond returns to the change in the portfolio weight on 
U.S. bonds differ slightly in that the equation for the U.S. bond lacks an exchange rate term.  
Using (6) in (7), the equation for the expected n-period U.S. real bond return is  
∆     ,   
 ,    ∆     ,   
        ·   · 0.22  ,     .      ( 8 )
17 
The analogous expression for the change in the expected bond return of country j is  
                                                 
17 This assumes that the U.S. bond return is the first element of rt and that the corresponding element of   
  is zero.  21 
 
∆     ,   
 ,   ∆      ,   
 ,   ∆     ,   
        ·   · 0.22  ,          ( 9 )  
Equation (9) uses the change in the expected rate of appreciation of the USD (∆     ,   
 ,  ), 
which is not directly observable.  Under the assumption that the LSAP announcements do not 
change the expected, long-run real exchange rate, Appendix B on the PB model shows that (9) 
implies that  
∆     ,   
 ,   ∆     ,   
   ∆    
       ·   · 0.22  ,      ,    (10) 
where ∆   
  is the jump in the spot exchange rate between country j and the US (NC/USD) at the 
announcement time. We take 10 years to be the long-run in the empirical work.  Further, 
Appendix B shows that by combining (8) and (10), one can obtain an expression for the 
exchange rate change during the LSAP announcement windows, as a function of the 
international expected real interest rate differential and the parameters of the PB model.  
∆   
     ∆      ,   
 ,    ∆     ,   
       ∆      ,   
 ,   ∆     ,   
     ·   · 0.22  ,                  (11) 
We can compare the predictions of equations (8), (10) and (11) with the data in the following 
ways. Specifically, we can compute the right hand side of (8) (   · ·0 . 2 2    ,     ) from 
historical data on international 10-year bond returns and compare the bootstrapped distribution of 
that statistic to the observed change in local currency nominal yields less breakeven inflation 
(hereafter expected inflation) from TIPS or inflation swaps.
18  Likewise, using (10), we can 
compare the observed combination of the change in the foreign 10-year nominal bond yield 
                                                 
18 This paper uses both inflation indexed bond data and inflation swap data to measure changes in expected inflation.  
Breakeven inflation rates from real-nominal bond spreads or swaps should measure changes in expected inflation 
better than levels of expected inflation in the presence of large risk premia.  Inflation indexed bonds and inflation 
swap data provide very similar inference on changes in expected inflation for cases in which both are available. 
Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) show that economic news influences private agents' long-run inflation 
expectations. 22 
 
(∆     ,   
 ,  ), expected 10-year foreign inflation (∆    ,   
  ) and the exchange rate “jump” (∆   
 ) 
during the announcement windows to the distribution of the statistic from the PB model (   ·   ·
0.22  ,     ). Finally, in (11), we can compute a distribution for      0.22  ,              from 
10-year real bond return data, observe changes in the expected real returns to U.S. and foreign 
bonds during the announcement windows, and compare that sum to the actual exchange rate 
changes (∆   
 ) observed during the announcement windows.   
6.3 Estimating the parameters of the portfolio balance model 
To examine whether the LSAP announcement produced changes in asset prices that are 
consistent with the PB model, we estimate V, E(r) and w from historical data. We use 303 real 
monthly returns in U.S. goods, 1985:02 to 2010:04, on the S&P 500, and U.S., Canadian, British, 
Japanese, and German 10-year bond indices to estimate E(r) and V. The weighting vector is 
estimated as     
 
             both because data on outstanding international bond supplies by 
maturity are not available and because the estimate is model-consistent.  To measure the effect of 
sampling variation on the estimates of      and  , I bootstrapped 1000 samples of 303 
observations from the six return series, maintaining the whole sample contemporaneous 
covariance in each draw and used those to construct 1000 estimates of the model parameters 
(    ,   and w).  Appendix C on Estimating the Portfolio Balance Model provides detail on the 
estimates of  ,      and  .  
Using the estimates of      ,     and the Gagnon et al (2011b) calculation that the LSAP 
announcements reduced the weight on U.S. bonds by 22 percent, equations (8) and (10) imply 
that the LSAP program—taken as a whole—would reduce the expected U.S. bond real return by 23 
 
88 basis points —with a confidence interval from 29 to 150 basis points—and the foreign 
expected real 10-year bond index returns (in U.S. goods) by 57 to 76 basis points, depending on 
the country, with confidence intervals of approximately 20 to 134 basis points, varying with the 
country.
19  
7.  Discussion 
Section 6 makes three testable predictions from the PB /PPP model about asset prices during 
LSAP windows:  1) U.S. long-bond expected real returns—or their equivalent in real yields—fall 
29 to 150 basis points; 2) the USD jump depreciates according to equation (11); 3) the foreign 
long-bond expected real yields in U.S. goods fall by 20 to 134 basis points, depending on the 
country and accounting for sampling variation in estimating the PB model parameters. This 
section evaluates the extent to which the data bears these predictions out.  
7.1 Portfolio balance effects and expected real returns 
Expected 10-year inflation data from TIPS and/or inflation swaps data are only available for 
the United States, Germany and the United Kingdom. Therefore we assess the consistency of the 
model’s predictions with the data for these three countries.  
∆     ,    
 ,    ∆     ,    
      1 0· ·0 . 2 2    ,           ( 8 )  
∆     ,    
 ,   ∆     ,    
   ∆    
     1 0· ·0 . 2 2    ,            ( 1 0 )  
 
Table 6 compares the observed changes in U.S., German and British real yields in U.S. goods 
(the left-hand side of (8) and (10)) for various combinations of event windows with the 
corresponding distribution of changes in bond returns implied by the PB model (the right-hand 
                                                 
19 For simplicity, these calculations assume that V is homoskedastic.  Estimates with a shorter and more recent 
sample— from 2000 to 2010— produce wider confidence intervals that are shifted somewhat in the positive 
direction.  Accounting for heteroskedasticity would likely produce wider confidence intervals.  24 
 
side of (8) and (10)).
20 The “buy+sell” changes in U.S., German and British real returns are well 
within the distribution of implied real returns in U.S. goods.  And the “All Event Sum” for the 
U.S. and Germany are likewise within the implied distributions, suggesting that the results for 
these countries are robust to the choice of event window sets.  The British “All Event Sum” is 
151 basis points, greater in absolute value than the PB implied distribution.  
Combining equations (8) and (10) provides an expression for the “jump” in the EUR/USD 
and GBP/USD exchange rates (equation (11)).  Because the observed quantities in equations (8) 
and (10) fit the predicted quantities fairly well, the examination of (11) is redundant but is 
included for completeness.  The right-hand panel of Table 6 shows actual “buy+sell” EUR/USD 
and GBP/USD exchange rate changes are -7.76 percent and -3.54 percent, which are well within 
the distribution of implied changes in the bottom panel.   
∆   
     ∆      ,    
 ,    ∆     ,    
       ∆      ,    
 ,   ∆     ,    
      10   0.22  ,                 (11)  
7.2 Are the foreign exchange jumps consistent with the monetary stimulus?  
Table 6 suggests that the portfolio balance model can explain the observed linear 
combination of asset price changes that we observed in response to the LSAP announcements.  
That is, the exchange rate responses are basically consistent with the model given the real yield 
changes and vice versa.  Unfortunately, the mean-variance model is insufficiently rich to 
separately identify the effects on exchange rates and yields.   
How can one pin down the separate impacts on exchange rates and long-term foreign bond 
yields?  One possibility is to use some measure of money to separately pin down the variables. 
                                                 
20 The calculations in Table 6 use BIS zero-coupon yields—which provide very similar inference to the results in 
Table 2—and inflation expectations from real-nominal bonds and inflation swaps.  All returns are continuously 
compounded.  
Section 6.1’s simple portfolio model predicted changes in real holding period bond returns in U.S. goods, but 
the observed changes are in nominal yields, which are average returns to maturity.  A full term structure model 
would be necessary to formally compare returns and yields, so the comparison is an approximation.   25 
 
This is likely to be fruitless as the relationships between monetary aggregates and other variables 
are notoriously unstable. This is likely to be particularly true when banks held most of the 
injected monetary base as interest bearing reserves.  
Another possible way to separately pin down the effect of the LSAP on exchange rates and 
bond yields is to ask whether the initial exchange rate reactions to the LSAP announcements are 
consistent with the typical response of equivalent federal funds shocks. This requires two 
elements: 1) The typical response of exchange rates to conventional monetary (federal funds) 
shocks; and 2) A mapping between federal funds surprises and the long-term interest-rate 
changes. 
Measuring the reaction of exchange rates to federal funds surprises is straightforward. We 
follow Andersen et al (2003) and Faust et al (2007) in estimating the impact of federal funds 
shocks on exchange rates.  Roughly consistent with their findings, we find that a 100 basis point 
fed funds shock can be expected to move the EUR/USD from 30 to 180 basis points and the 
GBP/USD from 8 to 123 basis points, with midpoints of 107 and 66 basis points.
21  
Mapping federal funds shocks to long-term interest rate stimulus is less obvious. Comparing 
the results of Fuhrer and Moore (1995) to those of Rudebusch (2002), however, Rudebusch 
(2010) finds that a given change in long term interest rates has four times the effect on output of 
a similarly sized short-term interest rate movement. How big were the LSAP’s effects on 10-year 
U.S. yields? Using the 1-day windows with the “buy+sell” event set, the LSAP most likely 
reduced U.S 10-year real rates by 123.4 basis points (see Table 6). Using Rudebusch’s (2010) 
                                                 
21 Faust et al. (2007) estimate that a 100 basis point surprise reduction to the federal funds rate depreciates the USD 
by 0.66 and 1.23 percent versus the GBP and EUR, respectively.  Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005b) suggest that U.S. 
macro surprises have a larger effect on exchange rates than euro area surprises because the U.S. macro 
announcements are released earlier in the month than are the German or euro area announcements.  26 
 
formula for the impact of a change in long rates in terms of fed funds, this would be equivalent to 
a 494 basis point change in the federal funds rate.  
What do these estimates imply for an impact of the LSAP announcements on exchange rates? 
Using the point estimates of the fed funds effects on foreign exchange (107 and 66 basis points 
per 100 fed funds points) and the 494 basis point estimate of the LSAP’s impact in terms of fed 
funds shocks, the LSAP would be expected to reduce the value of the USD by 5.28 percent 
against the EUR and 3.25 percent against the GBP.
22 These point estimates are reasonably 
consistent with the actual “buy+sell” event window changes in the USD/EUR and USD/GBP of 
7.76 and 3.54 percent.  If one allows for the uncertainty associated with the three estimates ─ 
even just the uncertainty associated with the impact of fed funds on exchange rates ─ then the 
announcement effects are completely consistent with what we might expect from the usual 
reaction of exchange rates to conventional monetary shocks. 
7.3 Another explanation: Markets interpreted the LSAP as signaling weak growth 
Some observers have argued that the LSAP buy announcements potentially affected yields 
because they were interpreted as “bad news” about the global economy and thus provoked 
declines in global bond yields to match weaker global growth.  For example,  
[T]he Fed’s unprecedented announcements of asset purchases with the goal of putting 
further downward pressure on yields might well have had an important signaling 
component, in the sense of conveying to market participants how bad the economic 
situation really was, and that extraordinarily easy monetary policy was going to be in 
place for some time to come.   — Bauer and Rudebusch (2011), page 6.  
Do the data support this “forecast of weak growth” hypothesis?  If the LSAP 
                                                 
22 The Rudebusch calculations for the equivalent economic stimulus of long and short rates must consider real rates 
but the calculations of the impact of the fed funds rate on exchange rates use nominal interest rates.  Given that 
nominal inflation expectations have been well anchored for many years, however, the nominal fed funds surprises 
are approximately equivalent to real fed funds surprises.  
Although the LSAP affected foreign long rates as well as U.S. long rates, all monetary policy actions 
presumably have some effect on foreign rates through portfolio balance and/or signaling so the LSAP’s effects on 
foreign rates are implicitly included in the calculations of the effect of fed funds shocks on exchange rates.  27 
 
announcements signaled lower growth, one would expect them to prompt declines in equity and 
oil prices.
23 The high-frequency equity and oil futures data in Figures 2 through 6 fail to support 
this hypothesis:  LSAP buy announcements were usually associated with either significant gains 
in oil and equity prices or with very little reaction at all.   
In addition, two further pieces of evidence weigh against this view:  1)  1-day equity 
returns in the LSAP announcement windows for 6 major international equity indices show no 
strong tendency to be negative over LSAP “buy” or “buy+sell” days.
24  2)  The depreciation of 
the USD on LSAP announcement days is not consistent with the usual appreciation of the dollar 
on “flight-to-quality” news about the global economy.   
7.4 Did the LSAP effects last?  
Shortly after the final buy announcement on March 18, 2009, long-term nominal Treasury 
yields rose fairly steadily, gaining almost 150 basis points by mid-June.  Long-term, sovereign, 
local currency, nominal yields from Australia, Canada, Germany, and the U.K. similarly rose 
during the March-to-June period (Figure 1).  These changes led many observers to conclude that 
the LSAP failed because long yields did not remain low.  Why did U.S. and foreign yields 
increase and does this imply that the LSAP effects did not last?  
Given that uncertainty about asset prices usually rises with the forecast horizon, no one can 
know the LSAP’s long-term effects; but efficient markets implies that the market's best guess 
must have been that the LSAP effects would persist. Otherwise, expectations of a temporary 
                                                 
23 I thank Jim Hamilton for suggesting the examination of oil prices as a signal of weak growth.   
24 Full daily equity responses are omitted for brevity but are available from the author. The only large negative 
return in U.S. and foreign data occurred on December 1, 2008.  High frequency data show that the Bernanke speech 
was very unlikely to have produced this reaction, however. The bottom panel of Figure 3 shows that the December 1 
drop in S&P 500 prices was associated with the opening return, with some further fall at the close. Negative U.S. 
macro news—construction spending, the ISM index and the NBER recession announcement—were likely to have 
produced this. The Chairman’s speech at 1:40 PM EST on December 1 produced significant rises in bond futures 
prices but essentially no movement in foreign exchange, oil or equity markets.  28 
 
impact would have created a risk-arbitrage opportunity for investors to bet on the reversal of the 
LSAP effects.  
And there were non-LSAP shocks that affected yields during this period. Meyer and Bomfim 
(2009) argue that higher expected growth, new Treasury issuance, and the return of investors’ 
risk appetite drove the increase in Treasury yields from late March through mid-June 2009.  The 
parallel rise in equity and oil prices over the same March-to-June period corroborates the 
explanation that higher expected growth and a rise in risk appetites raised long rates.  To the 
extent that the LSAP increased confidence and risk appetites, it sowed the seeds of its own 
partial reversal; but higher confidence signals success rather than failure. 
8.  Conclusion 
This paper has illustrated that LSAP buy announcements reduced expected long-term U.S. 
bond real yields, expected long-term foreign bond real yields in U.S. goods, and the spot value of 
the dollar.  The asset price changes associated with the LSAP buy announcements were much too 
large to have been generated by chance and these price changes closely followed LSAP 
announcements.  These basic results are fairly robust to changes in the length of the event 
windows from 2.5 hours to 2 days and to the inclusion or exclusion of non-LSAP FOMC events 
from November 2008 through January 2010.  
The jump depreciations of the USD during the LSAP announcement windows range from 3.5 
to 8 percent and are consistent with past estimates of the effect of equivalent federal funds policy 
shocks.   
Expected real 10-year Treasury yields fell by a total of 123 basis points during the 8 LSAP 
“buy+sell” windows.  Expected German and U.K. bond yields in U.S. goods also declined 
substantially, falling 111 and 91 basis points, respectively, for buy+sell windows.  These 29 
 
expected real bond yield declines are consistent with the predictions of a simple portfolio choice 
model that was estimated using monthly data from 1985 to 2010.  
One should emphasize, however, that the estimated asset price responses do depend on the 
procedures used to some extent.  Using a broader or narrower event set or size of event windows 
will affect the estimates of the asset price reactions.  For example, using the broadest set of 
events (i.e., all FOMC events) and wide windows substantially reduces the impact on foreign 
yields.  This same switch—from buy+sell events to all FOMC events—actually increases the 
effect on exchange rates, however.   
Equity and oil prices do not appear to support the hypothesis that real yields fell because the 
LSAP announcements reduced expected real growth.  One cannot, however, rule out other 
potential channels by which the LSAP influenced long rates, such as by reducing expected future 
short rates.  Concurrent research is exploring that possibility.  
The announcements of minor delays or reductions in LSAP purchases had much smaller 
effects than did the buy announcements because they affected expectations much less. Neither 
did the LSAP announcements consistently influence international overnight interest rates. 
Likewise, FOMC announcements that were not associated with LSAP news had inconsistent 
effects on asset prices, especially at high frequency.   
Some observers have interpreted the increases in U.S., Australian, Canadian, German, and 
U.K. long-term, nominal sovereign debt yields after the final LSAP buy announcement, from 
March 2009 to June 2009, as indicating that the LSAP’s effects were short-lived and therefore 
not useful.  In fact, the parallel rise in equity and oil prices over the same March-to-June period 
suggests that the LSAP successfully increased confidence and risk appetites. While it is certainly 30 
 
possible that markets initially under or overestimated the LSAP’s impact, the efficient markets 
hypothesis implies that the initial impact is the best point estimate of the LSAP’s long-run effect. 
The success of the LSAP in reducing long-term interest rates and the value of the dollar 
shows that central banks are not toothless when short rates hit the zero bound.  Contrary to long- 
and widely held conventional wisdom, large asset purchases affect both domestic and 
international asset prices.  The reduction in nominal foreign bond yields and the value of the 
USD is likely to have stimulated the U.S. economy through export channels, for example.  From 
an international perspective, these findings imply that central banks should coordinate their asset 
purchase policies to avoid contradictory or overly stimulative effects.   
  31 
 
References 
Aït-Sahalia, Y.,  Andritzky, J., Jobst, A., Nowak, S., Tamirisa, N., 2010. Market response to 
policy initiatives during the global financial crisis. NBER Working Paper No. 15809.  
Almeida, A., Goodhart, C., Payne, R., 1998. The effects of macroeconomic news on high 
frequency exchange rate behavior. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 33 (3), 
383-408. 
Andersen, T.G., Bollerslev, T., Diebold, F.X., Vega, C., 2003. Micro effects of macro 
announcements: real-time price discovery in foreign exchange. American Economic 
Review 93, 38–62. 
Barr, M.S., 2010. Written Testimony as Prepared for Delivery to Subcommittee on Capital 
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprise of House Committee on 
Financial Services.  
Bauer, M.D., Rudebusch, G.D., 2011. The Signaling Channel for Federal Reserve Bond 
Purchases. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper 2011-21. 
Blinder, A.S., 2000. Monetary policy at the zero lower bound: balancing the risks. Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking 32 (5), 1093-1099. 
Campbell, J.Y., 1999. Comment on Gregory D. Hess, The Maturity structure of government debt 
and asset substitutability in the U.K.. In: K. Alec Chrystal (Ed.), Government Debt 
Structure and Monetary Conditions. Bank of England, London.  
Carlson, J.A., Lo, M., 2006. One minute in the life of the DM/US$: public news in an electronic 
market. Journal of International Money and Finance 25 (7), 1090-1102. 
D’Amico, S., King, T.B., 2010. Flow and stock effects of large scale asset purchases. Federal 
Reserve Board Finance and Economics Discussion paper 2010-52.  
Doh, T., 2010. The efficacy of large-scale asset purchases at the zero lower bound. Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City Review Second Quarter, 5-34.  
Ehrmann, M., Fratzscher, M., 2005a. Equal Size, Equal Role? Interest Rate Interdependence 
Between the Euro Area and the United States. The Economic Journal 115(506), 928–948. 
Ehrmann, M., Fratzscher, M., 2005b. Exchange Rates and Fundamentals: New Evidence from 
Real-Time Data. Journal of International Money and Finance 24(2), 317–341. 
Evans, M.D.D., 2010. Exchange rate dynamics. Princeton University Press forthcoming.  
Fama, E.F., 1970. Efficient capital markets: a review of theory and empirical work. Journal of 
Finance 25 (2), 383-417.  32 
 
Faust, J., Rogers, J.H., Wang, S.B., Wright, J.H., 2007.The high-frequency response of exchange 
rates and interest rates to macroeconomic announcements,  Journal of Monetary 
Economics 54(4), 1051–1068. 
Fuhrer, J.C., Moore, G.R., 1995. Monetary Policy Trade-offs and the Correlation between 
Nominal Interest Rates and Real Output. The American Economic Review 85(1), 219–
239. 
Gagnon, J.E., Raskin, M., Remache, J., Sack, B.P., 2011a. The Financial Market Effects of the 
Federal Reserve’s Large-Scale Asset Purchases. International Journal of Central Banking 
7(1), 3-43. 
Gagnon, J.E., Raskin, M., Remache, J., Sack, B.P., 2011b. Large-scale asset purchases by the 
Federal Reserve: Did they work? Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy 
Review 17(1), 41-59. 
Gürkaynak, R.S., Sack, B., Swanson, E., 2005. The Sensitivity of Long-Term Interest Rates to 
Economic News: Evidence and Implications for Macroeconomic Models. The American 
Economic Review 95(1), 425-436. 
Hamilton, J. D., Wu, J., 2010. The Effectiveness of alternative monetary policy tools in a zero 
lower bound environment, unpublished manuscript, UCSD Department of Economics.  
Joyce, M., Lasaosa, A., Stevens, I., Tong, M., 2010. The financial market impact of quantitative 
easing, Bank of England Working Paper No. 393. 
Kohn, D.L., 2009. Monetary policy research and the financial crisis: strengths and shortcomings. 
Speech delivered at the Federal Reserve Conference on Key Developments in Monetary 
Policy, Washington D.C.  
Kozicki, S., Santor, E., Suchanek, L., 2010. Central bank balance sheets and the long-term 
forward rates, working paper, Bank of Canada.  
Kumhof, M., 2010. On the theory of sterilized foreign exchange intervention, Journal of 
Economic Dynamics and Control 34(8), 1403–1420.  
Love, R., Payne, R., 2008. Macroeconomic news, order flows, and exchange rates. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 43 (2), 467-488. 
Meyer, L.H., Bomfim, A.N., 2009. Were treasury purchases effective? Don’t just focus on 
treasury yields…. Monetary Policy Insights: Fixed Income Focus. 
Meyer, L.H. and Bomfim, A.N., 2010. Quantifying the effects of Fed asset purchases on treasury 
yields. Monetary Policy Insights: Fixed Income Focus. 33 
 
Modigliani, F., Sutch, R., 1966. Innovations in interest rate policy. The American Economic 
Review 56 (1-2), 178-197. 
Neely, C.J., Dey, S.R., 2010. A survey of announcement effects on foreign exchange returns.  
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 92 (5), 417-463. 
Rigobon, R., Sack, B., 2004. The impact of monetary policy on asset prices. Journal of Monetary 
Economics 51 (8), 1553-1575. 
Rudebusch, G.D. 2002. Assessing Nominal Income Rules for Monetary Policy with Model and 
Data Uncertainty. The Economic Journal 112 (479), 402–432. 
Rudebusch, G.D., 2010. The Fed’s Exit Strategy for Monetary Policy, FRBSF Economic Letter, 
2010-18.  
Stroebel, J.C., Taylor, J.B., 2009. Estimated impact of the Fed’s mortgage-backed securities 
purchase program. NBER Working Paper No. 15626.  
Valente, G., 2009. International interest rates and U.S. monetary policy announcements: 
evidence from Hong Kong and Singapore. Journal of International Money and Finance 
28 (6), 920-940.  
Vayanos, D. and Vila, J., 2009. A preferred-habitat model of the term structure of interest rates.   
London School of Economics working paper. 
Warnock, F.E., Warnock, V.C., 2009. International capital flows and U.S. interest rates. Journal 
of International Money and Finance 28 (6), 903-919. 
  34 
 
Appendix A:  Non-LSAP News During the LSAP Event Windows 
The event study methodology will be biased to the extent that non-LSAP news in the 
LSAP event windows importantly influences asset prices.  To determine the importance of non-
LSAP news during these event windows, we searched news sources for incidents of 
macroeconomic and other non-LSAP news.  The daily Dow Jones Treasury Market recap was 
especially useful in determining factors that influenced bond markets.   
At first glance, there appear to be several bits of non-LSAP news that might significantly 
influence bond and/or foreign exchange prices during the event windows.  There were, for 
example, at least two U.S. macro announcements during most event windows and the CPI 
release on December 16 was a fairly large negative surprise. There were several Fed news events 
that were not directly related to the LSAP: The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility 
(TALF) was announced coincidentally with the first asset purchase announcement on November 
25, the FOMC announced that it would implement TALF on January 28, 2009 and the FOMC 
reduced the funds target from 100 bp to a 0-25 bp range on December 16, 2008.  On December 
16, 2008 the FOMC statement forecasted “… exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate 
for some time” and on March 18, this was revised to “… exceptionally low levels of the federal 
funds rate for an extended period.” 
Despite the existence of non-LSAP news events, examination of previous event studies, 
news reports, and high-frequency price responses suggest that none of the non-LSAP events had 
particularly large effects on bond or foreign exchange markets.  That is, Faust et al. (2007) find 
that CPI surprises do not influence exchange rates in an economically or statistically significant 
sense.  Similarly, the FOMC fed funds reduction on December 16 was largely expected, with a 
surprise component of only 12.5 basis points, and so probably produced very small effects.  35 
 
Faust et al.’s (2007) point estimates imply that this fed funds shock would produce a trivial 1.25 
basis point change in nominal 10-year Treasury yields.  Finally, the Dow Jones Treasury Market 
recaps generally led with LSAP news after buy announcements.  Thus, there appears to be no 
particularly strong bias from non-LSAP news on LSAP buy days.    
Table A1:  Non-LSAP news during the LSAP buy announcement windows 
 
 




Std Dev of 
Forecast Errors
Unit
11/23/2008 Citigroup Capital Injection
11/25/2008 TALF Announcement 8:15 AM
Chain Deflator (Preliminary) 8:30 AM 4.20% 4.20% 0.00% level
GDP (Preliminary) 8:30 AM -0.50% -0.50% 0.00% 0.39% Q/Q %Chg
Consumer Confidence 10:00 AM 44.9 38.3 6.60 5.13
Minutes of October discount rate meetings 
released
2:00 PM
12/1/2008 Construction Spending 10:00 AM -1.20% -1% -0.20% 1% M/M %Chg
ISM Index 10:00 AM 36.2 37 -0.80 2.07 Index, 50+ =  Increasing
NBER officially declares a recession.  10:36 AM
12/16/2008 Building Permits 8:30 AM 620 700 -80 60 level, thousands
Housing Starts 8:30 AM 625 350 275 97 level, thousands
Core CPI 8:30 AM 0% 0.10% -0.10% 0.11% M/M %Chg
CPI 8:30 AM -1.70% -1.30% -0.40% 0.15% M/M %Chg
FOMC Rate Decision 2:15 PM 0-0.25% 0.250% 0.125%
Cuts in Fed Discount Rates 2:15 PM
FOMC statement forecast "...exceptionally 
low levels of the federal funds rate for 
some time."
2:15 PM
1/28/2009 Crude Inventories 10:30 AM 1,762,000 barrels
FOMC Rate Decision 2:15 PM 0-0.25% 0.125% 0.00%
TALF to be implented 2:15 PM
3/18/2009 Core CPI 8:30 AM 0.20% 0.10% 0.10% 0.11% M/M %Chg
CPI 8:30 AM 0.40% 0.30% 0.10% 0.15% M/M %Chg
Current Account Balance 8:30 AM -132.8 -137 4.2 6.64 billions of dollars
Crude Inventories 10:30 AM 1,784,000 barrels
FOMC Rate Decision 2:15 PM 0-0.25% 0.125% 0.00%
TALF Collateral Expansion 2:15 PM
FOMC statement forecast "… exceptionally 
low levels of the federal funds rate for an 
extended period."
2:15 PM
UK announcement on QE purchase facility details (3/19/2009)36 
 
Appendix B:  Portfolio Balance Model Predictions 
The expected returns for a mean-variance optimizer must satisfy the following:  
   ,          ,   
       ,   
       ,   
                (A.1) 
where     ,    is the N by 1 vector of expected real returns in U.S. goods to international bond 
investors, V is the N by N covariance matrix of those real returns, wt is the N by 1 vector of 
portfolio weights at time t,     ,   
   is the N by 1 vector of expected international nominal bond 
returns,    ,   
   is the vector of expected changes in foreign currency units per dollar and    ,   
    
is expected (breakeven) U.S. inflation.  
A change in weights at time t—∆   — produces the following change in expected returns:  
∆     ,   
   ∆      ,   
   ∆     ,   
        ∆        (A.2) 
where the ∆  operator denotes the change in the variable at time t.  If the only change in the 
expected portfolio weight vector on the days of the LSAP announcement was a 22 percent 
reduction in U.S. securities outstanding, then (A.2) becomes the following for an n-period return 
to U.S. bonds:  
∆     ,   
 ,    ∆     ,   
        ·   · 0.22  ,         (A.3) 
where   ,  is the weight of U.S. securities in the public’s portfolio at time t and      is the (1,1) 
element of V, the variance of U.S. real bond returns. (A.3) uses the fact that the expected 
exchange rate return is always zero for U.S. bonds. For an n-period return to foreign bonds, (A.2) 
becomes 
∆     ,   
 ,   ∆      ,   
 ,   ∆     ,   
        ·   · 0.22  ,         (A.4) 37 
 
This real return to the foreign bond depends on the expected rate of appreciation of the USD. 
One can subtract (A.4) from (A.3) to get an expression for the change in expected USD 
appreciation against currency j, ∆     ,   
 ,  . 
∆     ,   
 ,   ∆      ,   
 ,   ∆      ,   
 ,     · ·0 . 2 2    ,                (A.5) 
Note that if investors were risk-neutral (  0   , this expression would collapse to the usual 
expression for expected exchange rate changes under uncovered interest parity.  
The expected long-run rate of nominal appreciation is unobserved.  To determine it using 
observable variables, we assume that goods market equilibrium determines the real exchange 
rate over the long run (purchasing power parity) and that LSAP announcements do not change 
the long-run expected real exchange rate.  These assumptions imply that   
∆      
   ∆     ,   
    ∆     ,   
   0           (A.6) 
for large n. Applying the ∆  operator to the identity    ,   
         ,   
       
   and using the fact 
that aggregate price levels did not jump at the time of the LSAP announcements, implies that the 
change in the expected future price level is the change in the expected inflation rate ∆    ,   
    
∆    ,   
   . This can be substituted into (A.6) to imply  
∆      
   ∆     ,   
   ∆     ,   
             (A.7) 
Applying the ∆  operator to an identity for expected USD appreciation      ,   
 ,          
   
  
  , gives 
∆     ,   
 ,   ∆       
   ∆    
       (A.8) 38 
 
where ∆   
   is the “jump” in the nominal exchange rate at the time of the announcement. Using 
the expression (A.7) for ∆      
   in (A.8), one gets an expression for the change in the expected 
rate of appreciation of the dollar in terms of the difference in changes in expected inflation and 
the exchange rate jump at the time of the announcement.   
∆     ,   
 ,   ∆     ,   
   ∆     ,   
    ∆    
     (A.9) 
Substituting the right-hand side of (A.9) into (A.5) and solving for ∆    implies an expression for 
the exchange rate jump at the time of the LSAP announcements in terms of changes in relative n-
year real interest rates and the mean-variance risk premium.  
∆   
     ∆      ,   
 ,    ∆     ,   
       ∆      ,   
 ,   ∆     ,   
        ·    ·  0.22  ,                 (A.10) 
Alternatively, one could take the expression for ∆     ,   
 ,   on the right-hand side of (A.9) 
and substitute it back into (A.4) to equate the sum of the change in the locally denominated, 
foreign real return and the exchange rate jump with the PB risk premium.  
∆     ,   
 ,   ∆     ,   
   ∆    
       ·   · 0.22  ,         (A.11) 
Assuming that one can compare changes in yields—which are average returns over the life of 
the security—to changes in expected returns, (A.3), (A.10) and (A.11) provide testable 
predictions about changes in asset prices during windows around the LSAP announcements.  
Specifically, in (A.3) we can compute the right hand side (   · ·0 . 2 2    ,     ) from historical 
data and compare the distribution of that statistic to the observed change in local currency, 
nominal yields less expected inflation from TIPS or inflation swaps.   
∆     ,   
 ,    ∆     ,   
        ·   · 0.22  ,         (A.3) 39 
 
In (A.11), we can similarly compare the observed combination of the change in local 
currency, nominal, foreign bond yield (∆     ,   
 ,  ), expected inflation (∆    ,   
  ) and the 
exchange rate “jump” (∆   
 ) during the announcement windows to the distribution of the 
statistic from the PB model (   · ·0 . 2 2    ,     ). Finally, in (A.10), we can compute a 
distribution for      0.22  ,              from historical data, observe changes in the expected 
real returns to U.S. and foreign bonds during the announcement windows and compare that sum 
to the actual exchange rate changes (∆   
 ) observed during the announcement windows.   
  There is a redundancy in these three equations.  (A.10) is a combination of (A.3) and 
(A.11).  Results from all three are presented for completeness.  
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Appendix C:  Estimating the Portfolio Balance Model 
The annualized values of       for the S&P 500, U.S., Canadian, U.K., Japanese and 
German 10-year bonds are 7.0, 5.8, 7.6, 7.5, 7.0 and 7.4.  The lower triangular of the 
corresponding     matrix of those annualized returns is as follows: 
 SP500  US Canada U.K. Japan  Germany
SP500  3019  
US  57 537  
Canada  694 381 1127  
U.K.  105 347 525 1841  
Japan  -130 342 237 911 2268 
Germany  -45 461 510 1276 1147  1854
 
Note that the above     matrix is equal to 12 times the usual covariance matrix of annual 
returns. If we denote monthly returns by r , , then the annualized return is 12*r , .  The variance 
of that annualized return is 144*var(r , ).  In contrast, the usual measure of annual return 
variance is 12* var(r , ).  Thus, the estimated S&P 500 variance (     ) of 3019 corresponds to 
the usual estimate of  3019/12   15.86. 
The elements of the normalized implied     vector are given by 0.118, 0.533, 0.169, 0.103, 
0.099 and -0.022.  The normalized elements of     do not depend on the scaling of returns or the 
assumed level of risk aversion.  Because the implied weights are backed out from the historical 
returns data (    
 
          ), the level of risk aversion does not affect the implied change in 
expected returns ( ΔE           ∆   ). 
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Figure 1:  Nominal yields on 10-year government bonds 
 
 
Notes:  The figure depicts nominal yields, in the respective currencies, on 10-year sovereign debt for the U.S., Australia, Canada, 
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Figure 2:  High-frequency nominal futures price movements on November 25, 2008 
 
Notes:  The figure shows the high-frequency movements of local currency international bond futures prices (top panel), spot exchange 
rates (center panel), and S&P 500 and NY light crude futures (bottom panel) in the hours around the initial LSAP press release 
(vertical line) on November 25, 2008.  The x-axis values denote hours from midnight, U.S. Eastern time, of the day of the 
announcement, and the vertical line denotes the time of the announcement. 
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Figure 3: High-frequency nominal futures price movements on December 1, 2008 
 
Notes:  The figure shows the high-frequency movements of local currency international bond futures prices (top panel), spot exchange 
rates (center panel) and S&P 500 and NY light crude futures (bottom panel) in the hours around Chairman Bernanke’s speech (vertical 
line) on December 1, 2008.  The x-axis values denote hours from midnight, U.S. Eastern time, of the day of the announcement, and 
the vertical line denotes the time of the announcement. 
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Figure 4: High-frequency nominal futures price movements on December 16, 2008 
Notes:  The figure shows the high-frequency movements of local currency international bond futures prices (top panel), spot exchange 
rates (center panel) and S&P 500 and NY light crude futures (bottom panel) in the hours around the FOMC release (vertical line) on 
December 16, 2008.  The x-axis values denote hours from midnight, U.S. Eastern time, of the day of the announcement, and the 
vertical line denotes the time of the announcement. 
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Figure 5: High-frequency nominal futures price movements on January 28, 2009 
 
Notes:  The figure shows the high-frequency movements of local currency international bond futures prices (top panel), spot exchange 
rates (center panel) and S&P 500 and NY light crude futures (bottom panel) in the hours around the FOMC release (vertical line) on 
January 28, 2009.  The x-axis values denote hours from midnight, U.S. Eastern time, of the day of the announcement, and the vertical 
line denotes the time of the announcement. 
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Figure 6: High-frequency nominal futures price movements on March 18, 2009 
 
Notes:  The figure shows the high-frequency movements of local currency international bond futures prices (top panel), spot exchange 
rates (center panel) and S&P 500 and NY light crude futures (bottom panel) in the hours around the FOMC release (vertical line) on 
March 18, 2009.  The x-axis values denote hours from midnight, U.S. Eastern time, of the day of the announcement, and the vertical 
line denotes the time of the announcement. 
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Table 1:  Announcements associated with the LSAP programs 
Announcements or suggestions of future purchases.     
Date Event Time  Bloomberg 
 time 
Event  Other significant news in the event window 
11/25/2008 Initial  LSAP 
announcement 
08:15   08:08  Fed announces purchases of $100 billion in GSE 
debt and up to $500 billion in MBS.   
FOMC minutes released on November 24.  
12/1/2008 Bernanke 
Speech 
13:40   13:45  Chairman Bernanke mentions that the Fed could 
purchase long-term Treasuries.  
Alistair Darling, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, promises backing to retail 
deposits at London Scottish Bank, 
effectively backing all retail bank deposits 
in the U.K.. Construction spending and ISM 
announcements come in weaker than 
expected. NBER dating committee 
officially declares a recession.  
12/16/2008 FOMC 
Statement 
14:15   14:21  FOMC statement first mentions possible purchase of 
long-term Treasuries. 
Federal funds rate target reduced from 1 
percent to a 0-25 bp target range.  
1/28/2009 FOMC 
Statement 
14:15  14:16  FOMC statement says that it is ready to expand 
agency debt and MBS purchases, as well as to 
purchase long-term Treasuries.   




14:15  14:17  FOMC will purchase an additional $750 billion in 
agency MBS and increase its purchases of agency 
debt and long-term Treasuries by $100 and $300 
billion, respectively.  
 
          
Announcements of limited or reduced purchases   
8/12/2009 FOMC 
Statement 
14:15   14:16  The FOMC will slow the pace of the LSAP, making 





14:15  14:16  FOMC will slow the purchases of agency MBS and 
agency debt, finishing the purchases by the end of 





14:15 14:19  Amount  of  agency debt to be halted at $175 billion, 
instead of $200 billion.  
The Reserve Bank of Australia raises its 
policy rate by 25 basis points on November 
4, 2009.  
Notes:  The table describes the 8 events associated with LSAP announcements.  The columns denote the date of the announcement, the nature of 
the event, the time of the event in U.S. Eastern time, the time of the first Bloomberg story on the event, a brief description of the event and a brief 
description of other possibly significant news events in a 3-day event window from t-1 through t+1. 48 
 
Table 2:  Effect of the LSAP on U.S. and foreign long-term bond yields 
 
Notes:  The table shows one-day nominal U.S. and foreign long-term interest rate yield changes in basis 
points around 8 LSAP news events and 13 FOMC control events, as well as sums over those event 
windows.  The “p-values” in parentheses below the yield changes show the proportions of n-day yield 
changes from July 2007 through January 2010 that were larger in absolute value than the actual change in 


















11/25/2008 -24 -9 -10 -10 2 -2 -7 -5.4
(0.01) (0.18) (0.19) (0.06) (0.72) (0.52) (0.22) (0.15)
12/1/2008 -21 -19 -9 -18 -8 -5 -14 -10.8
(0.01) (0.02) (0.26) (0.00) (0.15) (0.15) (0.04) (0.01)
12/16/2008 -16 -15 -18 -12 -16 -8 -17 -14.2
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) 0.00
 1/28/2009 12 14 -4 7 -1 1 3 1.2
(0.13) (0.06) (0.64) (0.17) (0.83) (0.80) (0.63) (0.74)
 3/18/2009 -51 -23 -24 -23 -15 -4 -8 -14.8
0.00 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.22) (0.19) 0.00
Buy Sum -100 -52 -65 -56 -38 -18 -43 -44
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 0.00
Sell Events
 8/12/2009 1 10 -17 2 5 -2 0 -2.4
(0.90) (0.15) (0.04) (0.74) (0.32) (0.52) (1.00) (0.54)
 9/23/2009 -2 -2 3 -1 -8 0 -6 -2.4
(0.83) (0.82) (0.75) (0.91) (0.15) (1.00) (0.34) (0.53)
11/4/2009 7 9 16 5 2 2 6 6.2
(0.38) (0.22) (0.05) (0.36) (0.72) (0.52) (0.30) (0.11)
Sell Sum 6 17 2 6 -1 0 0 1.4
(0.66) (0.17) (0.91) (0.51) (0.94) (1.00) (0.99) (0.84)
Buy+Sell Sum -94 -35 -63 -50 -39 -18 -43 -42.6
0.00 (0.10) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) 0.00
Control Sum 34 -6 37 3 34 9 22 21
(0.23) (0.83) (0.20) (0.89) (0.08) (0.42) (0.33) (0.14)
All Event Sum -60 -41 -26 -47 -5 -9 -21 -21.6
(0.09) (0.24) (0.47) (0.06) (0.84) (0.54) (0.46) (0.22)49 
 
Table 3:  Effect of the LSAP on U.S. and foreign overnight yields 
 
Notes:  The table shows the nominal U.S. and foreign overnight interest rate yield one-day changes in 
basis points around 8 LSAP news events and 13 control events, as well as sums over those event window 
sets. The “p-values” in parentheses below the yield changes show the proportions of n-day yield changes 
from July 2007 through January 2010 that were larger in absolute value than the actual change in the n-
day period around the event.  The Reserve Bank of Australia raised its policy rate by 25 basis points on 
November 4, 2009 (http://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/cash-rate.html).  
  
Date U.S. Australia Canada Germany Japan U.K. Average
Buy Events
11/25/2008 -3 0 -0.43 5 -0.3 0 0.2
(0.39) (1.00) (0.45) (0.28) (0.60) (1.00) (0.81)
12/1/2008 0 0 0.1 0 -2 0 -0.3
(1.00) (1.00) (0.79) (1.00) (0.09) (1.00) (0.72)
12/16/2008 -5 0 0.58 0 -0.3 0 -0.8
(0.32) (1.00) (0.33) (1.00) (0.60) (1.00) (0.54)
 1/28/2009 1 0 -0.36 7 0.5 7 2.5
(0.66) (1.00) (0.50) (0.23) (0.41) (0.15) (0.28)
 3/18/2009 -2 0 -0.5 -1 0.3 0 -0.5
(0.48) (1.00) (0.38) (0.60) (0.62) (1.00) (0.61)
Buy Sum -9 0 -0.6 11 -1.8 7 1.1
(0.64) (1.00) (0.74) (0.58) (0.44) (0.55) (0.88)
Sell Events
 8/12/2009 -1 0 0.25 2 0 0 0.2
(0.66) (1.00) (0.60) (0.47) (1.00) (1.00) (0.81)
 9/23/2009 0 0 0.19 0 1.2 0 0.2
(1.00) (1.00) (0.66) (1.00) (0.16) (1.00) (0.79)
11/4/2009 1 25 0.04 0 -0.3 0 4.3
(0.66) (0.02) (0.90) (1.00) (0.60) (1.00) (0.18)
Sell Sum 0 25 0.48 2 0.9 0 4.7
(1.00) (0.05) (0.70) (0.80) (0.53) (1.00) (0.42)
Buy+Sell Sum -9 25 -0.13 13 -0.9 7 5.8
(0.75) (0.14) (0.96) (0.66) (0.79) (0.70) (0.65)
Control Sum -3 -25 -0.02 -47 -0.9 -5 -13.5
(0.94) (0.20) (1.00) (0.33) (0.86) (0.87) (0.49)
All Event Sum -12 0 -0.1 -34 -1.8 2 -7.7
(0.85) (1.00) (0.98) (0.58) (0.82) (0.97) (0.81)50 
 
Table 4:  Effect of the LSAP on the foreign exchange value of the USD 
AUS/USD CAD/USD EUR/USD JPY/USD GBP/USD Average 
in FX rate
Buy Dates
11/25/2008 -0.17 -0.62 -1.27 -1.57 -2.28 -1.18
(0.87) (0.40) (0.08) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06)
12/1/2008 2.59 0.74 0.85 -2.49 3.85 1.11
(0.05) (0.33) (0.19) (0.01) 0.00 (0.07)
12/16/2008 -4.41 -2.53 -3.02 -2.18 -2.13 -2.86
(0.02) (0.01) 0.00 (0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
 1/28/2009 -0.19 -0.92 0.39 1.43 -0.30 0.08
(0.84) (0.24) (0.52) (0.09) (0.64) (0.88)
 3/18/2009 -2.52 -1.77 -3.60 -2.41 -1.68 -2.40
(0.05) (0.05) 0.00 (0.02) (0.05) (0.00)
Buy Sum -4.71 -5.10 -6.65 -7.23 -2.55 -5.25
(0.10) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.15) (0.00)
Sell Dates
 8/12/2009 -0.54 -1.25 -0.44 0.14 -0.16 -0.45
(0.58) (0.14) (0.48) (0.84) (0.78) (0.39)
 9/23/2009 0.36 0.59 0.38 0.12 0.10 0.31
(0.71) (0.41) (0.53) (0.86) (0.88) (0.55)
11/4/2009 -0.84 -0.39 -1.05 0.28 -0.92 -0.59
(0.38) (0.57) (0.14) (0.70) (0.19) (0.27)
Sell Sum -1.03 -1.06 -1.11 0.53 -0.99 -0.73
(0.59) (0.46) (0.36) (0.69) (0.43) (0.46)
Buy+Sell Sum -5.73 -6.16 -7.76 -6.70 -3.54 -5.98
(0.12) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.12) (0.00)
Control Sum -7.38 -6.84 -1.98 1.49 -6.14 -4.17
(0.13) (0.03) (0.45) (0.62) (0.04) (0.06)
All Event Sum -13.11 -13.00 -9.74 -5.20 -9.68 -10.15
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.18) (0.01) (0.00)  
Notes:  The table shows one-day exchange rate (FX per USD) changes in percentage points around 8 
LSAP news events and 13 FOMC control events, as well as sums over those event window sets.  The “p-
values” in parentheses below the yield changes show the proportions of n-day changes from July 2007 
through January 2010 that were larger in absolute value than the actual change in the n-day period around 
the event.  
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Table 5: Robustness of results to length of event window 
Long Bonds USD Exchange Rates
U.S. Australia Canada Germany Japan U.K.
Foreign 
Average Australia Canada Germany Japan U.K. Average
Buys 2-Day -107.0 -78.0 -54.0 -50.0 -19.0 -65.0 -53.2 -5.7 -4.6 -8.1 -10.8 -3.6 -6.6
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.00) (0.14) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.17) (0.00)
1-Day -100.0 -65.0 -56.0 -38.0 -18.0 -43.0 -44.0 -4.7 -5.1 -6.7 -7.2 -2.5 -5.2
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.10) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.15) (0.00)
2.5 Hours 5.1 0.5 3.3 2.6 1.0 1.8 1.8 -5.6 -4.2 -5.8 -3.2 -5.0 -4.8
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Sells 2-Day -11.0 6.0 8.0 1.0 -1.0 3.0 3.4 -1.5 0.5 -1.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.4
(0.55) (0.75) (0.55) (0.96) (0.92) (0.84) (0.75) (0.57) (0.79) (0.52) (0.97) (0.89) (0.79)
1-Day 6.0 2.0 6.0 -1.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 -1.0 -1.1 -1.1 0.5 -1.0 -0.7
(0.66) (0.91) (0.51) (0.94) (1.00) (0.99) (0.84) (0.59) (0.46) (0.36) (0.69) (0.43) (0.46)
2.5 Hours 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.1 -0.5 0.4 0.1
(0.15) (0.26) (0.32) (0.57) (0.95) (0.48) (0.49) (0.60) (0.35) (0.76) (0.23) (0.22) (0.58)
Control 2-Day 43.0 76.0 22.0 41.0 5.0 49.0 38.6 -8.5 -6.2 -2.7 4.2 -8.3 -4.3
(0.28) (0.05) (0.43) (0.14) (0.74) (0.15) (0.08) (0.19) (0.17) (0.47) (0.32) (0.07) (0.17)
1-Day 34.0 37.0 3.0 34.0 9.0 22.0 21.0 -7.4 -6.8 -2.0 1.5 -6.1 -4.2
(0.23) (0.20) (0.89) (0.08) (0.42) (0.33) (0.14) (0.13) (0.03) (0.45) (0.62) (0.04) (0.06)
2.5 Hours -0.2 0.0 0.4 -0.7 -0.5 -1.2 -0.4 0.7 -0.2 0.9 0.1 -0.3 0.2
(0.80) (0.99) (0.51) (0.10) (0.49) (0.16) (0.26) (0.68) (0.82) (0.26) (0.96) (0.69) (0.56)
All Events 2-Day -75.0 4.0 -24.0 -8.0 -15.0 -13.0 -11.2 -15.7 -10.3 -11.9 -6.7 -11.7 -11.2
(0.14) (0.94) (0.49) (0.83) (0.43) (0.76) (0.70) (0.06) (0.07) (0.02) (0.22) (0.04) (0.01)
1-Day -60.0 -26.0 -47.0 -5.0 -9.0 -21.0 -21.6 -13.1 -13.0 -9.7 -5.2 -9.7 -10.1
(0.09) (0.47) (0.06) (0.84) (0.54) (0.46) (0.22) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.18) (0.01) (0.00)
2.5 Hours 5.4 0.5 3.9 2.1 0.5 0.8 1.6 -4.7 -4.1 -4.7 -3.7 -4.9 -4.4
(0.00) (0.62) (0.00) (0.07) (0.63) (0.48) (0.15) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.10) (0.04) (0.06) 
Notes:  The left-hand portion of the table shows changes in nominal bond yields in basis points for 2- and 1-day windows and in percentage 
changes in bond futures prices for 2.5 hour windows.  The percentage change in an n-year, zero-coupon bond price should be equal to –
(n/100)*the change in the bond’s yield, measured in basis points. The right-hand panel shows percentage changes in the value of the dollar over 
various event windows. The “p-values” in parentheses below the yield changes show the proportions of n-day changes from July 2007 through 
January 2010 that were larger in absolute value than the actual change in the appropriately sized periods around the events. 52 
 
Table 6:  Predicted foreign bond returns and observed foreign yield changes 
 
Notes:  The top panel of the table shows the observed changes in real domestic yields in U.S. goods, in basis points, for various event window 
sums for U.S., German and U.K. yields. The observed changes are constructed from bond yield changes less changes in expected domestic 
inflation plus foreign exchange jumps. The bottom panel shows the statistics of the bootstrapped distribution of the predictions from the PB model. 
That is, the top-left panel shows the left-hand side of (8) for the U.S. and (10) for German and U.K. data. For each row in the top-left panel, the 
exchange rate change, ∆   , is the actual change in that row of the top right-hand panel.  For example, the German “Buy Event Sum” for the 
change in 10-year real bond yields in U.S. goods uses -6.65 as the exchange rate change.  The top-right hand panel shows the observed exchange 
rate change from the left-hand side of (11).  The bottom panel shows estimates of the distribution of the right-hand side of this equation for 
comparison.  
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U.S.  German  U.K. EUR/USD GBP/USD
Empirical Buy  Event  Sum -130.7 -100.7 -83.5 -6.65 -2.55
Sell Event Sum  7.3 -10.4 -7.5 -1.11 -0.99
Buy + Sell Event Sum -123.4 -111.1 -91.0 -7.76 -3.54
Control Event Sum -13.7 8.1 -60.7 -1.98 -6.14
All Event Sum -137.1 -103.0 -151.7 -9.74 -9.68
PB Implied Distribution
5th Percentile -149.6 -134.3 -101.7 -9.3 -6.2
10th Percentile -136.4 -119.7 -90.7 -9.0 -5.8
Point Estimate -87.9 -75.5 -56.9 -7.8 -3.7
90th Percentile -38.7 -33.6 -25.2 -6.1 -1.4
95th Percentile -29.1 -25.4 -18.1 -5.5 -0.5
Δ in 10-year Real Bond Yields in U.S. Goods 
(annual b.p.) Δ in FX (percent)